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I. THE PROTECTION OF THE CULTURAL HERITAGE AS 
AN INTERNATIONAL PROBLEM 
Although legislative concern to prevent activities that damage 
the cultural heritage goes back to at least the sixteenth century in 
Europe, 1 the effect of the greatly increased international and 
transnational activity this century has meant that many problems 
are beyond the capacity of national states to control. There have, 
therefore, been many attempts to use international law for the pro-
tection of the cultural heritage to formulate agreed policies on ac-
tivities affecting the cultural heritage. This movement has created 
some difficult issues for governments where cultural matters have 
traditionally not been a subject for government regulation. Most 
common law countries are in this group. Nevertheless, the use of 
legislative controls in new areas is an inevitable phenomenon: it 
is not so long, after all, since governments have been active in the 
field of public health. Indeed, there are many other areas, tradi-
tionally considered as matters for the internal policy-making pro-
cesses of a state, that have now become matters of international 
law and have created obligations for states to act within their 
borders, in ways which may or may not be in conformity with their 
historic methods of resolvling problems in the area. This is true 
of areas such as: human rights, which have important implications 
for national constitutional law; environmental law, which inevitably 
affects the law of property; and the control of narcotics. The inter-
national effect of activities on such matters has now become so 
significant that only international legal cooperation can give any 
hope of their resolution. 
* Dr. Juris (Tubingen), Licence speciale en droit international (Brussels). B.A,, LL.B. 
(Sydney). Reader in Jurisprudence and International Law, University of Sydney. Visiting 
Fulbright Senior Scholar, Syracuse University 1982-83. 
1. The sixteenth century was the first time in Europe when papal legislation was 
instituted on this topic. 
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Although, in recent years, interest has been focused on the 
problem of illegal export, it is important to see this issue in its 
proper context. National controls on export were not initiated to 
ensure the total prohibition of cultural transfers from the country 
of origin to the countries where there is an interested audience for 
that culture; such a policy would be ~elf-defeating. There are 
few, if any, states that would not be pleased to have their culture 
appreciated in other countries. Export control was, by and large, 
instituted as a response to the continued looting of archaeological 
sites and the theft of artistic objects, from both public and private 
collections, to feed foreign markets. Now other motives have been 
added, such as the idea of sheltering the national patrimony so that 
a significant reserve of national cultural materials exists in the coun-
try of origin. Again, it is important to see this issue in its context: 
many of the countires which feel most strongly about the "na-
tional patrimony" know that there are far greater collections of their 
best cultural materials abroad than in their own countries. This has 
fueled their determination to try to stop all traffic in national 
cultural objects. If they were ever in a situation where they had 
a national collection which was the best, or was at least a fair 
representation of t_he best products of their culture, a more 
relaxed attitude would almost certainly result in improved avenues 
of legitimate trade. 
A good example of this evolution has been within the People's 
Republic of China. During the hundred years prior to the Chinese 
Revolution of 1948, the Chinese had virtually no control over what 
cultural materials left the country. This situation engendered enor-
mous bitterness and resulted in legislation in 1930, which not only 
forbade export, but also prevented any person of foreign nationality 
from taking part in any archaeological excavation in China. This 
legislation also prohibited the transfer of registered objects from 
private hands to foreign hands within China.2 Since the Chinese 
have been pursuing their own cultural policies without outside help 
since the Revolution and have discovered what an enormous wealth 
of archaeological and artistic treasures still remains to be studied 
and cared for, the stridency of their complaints has been less 
2. Law on the Preservation of Ancient Objects 7 June 1930, art. 6 (China): Detailed Rules 
on the Implementation of the Legislation on the Preservation of Ancient Objects 3 July Year 
20 (1931], arts. 13, 14 (China). 
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noticeable. Thus, although export is still strictly controlled, avenues 
and resources for legitimate traffic in cultural objects are open.3 
The current concerns of Peru should also be understood in this 
context. The first legal regulation of the excavation of graves was 
made by the Spanish in 1575. A later decree was passed in 1822,4 
which forbade the excavation of prehispanic monuments. This law 
was instituted at the very moment when matters were first 
amenable to local regulation, as the decree followed three centuries 
of exploitation of the cultural heritage and excavation of graves 
for funerary goods, many of which were subsequently melted down 
for their gold. It was the beginning of a long battle by Peruvian 
authorities to stop the damage to the local cultural heritage. 
A number of decrees, of ever increasing severity, were passed 
during the nineteenth century, and in 1906 the Peruvian govern-
ment entered into a contract with the German archaeologist, Max 
Uhle, to survey, excavate and establish a national collection. Uhle 
remained in Peru for five years and made a significant contribu-
tion to South American archaeology. In 1929, an important law was 
passed to prevent clandestine excavation and export.5 A National 
Archaeological Service6 was set up to supervise and control excava-
tion, and to authorize only appropriate institutions to undertake 
digs. The battle against clandestine excavation and illegal export, 
two practices which have been closely associated from the earliest 
attempts at legislative control in Peru, became especially bitter in 
the 1930's, when important collections of Peruvian artifacts were 
looted: the cemetery of Paracas was illegally excavated and the 
National Museum's entire collection of 961 gold objects was stolen. 
Shortly after these thefts, there were sales of Peruvian relics in 
New York and London.7 It is hardly surprising that Peruvian at-
titudes became increasingly more rigid, eventually leading to severe 
restrictions on the activity of foreign archaeologists. This situation 
3. For similar conclusions, see Sun, The Preservation of Cultural Properties in China, 
2 ART RESEARCH NEWS 18 (1983). 
4. This legislation was passed during the period of disorder when the Spanish col-
onies were asserting their independence. 
5. Law No. 6634 of June 13, 1929 for the Defense and Conservation of Archaeological 
Monuments, implemented by Decree No. 6938 of Nov. 15, 1980 (Peru). 
6. The National Archaeological Service resulted from the proposals of Max Uhle. 
7. J.C. TELLO & T. MEJIA XESSPE, HISTORIA DE LOS MUSEOS NACIONALES DEL PERU 
1822-1946, 1938 (Publi<;~ciones del Institutio de Investigaciones Antropologicas No. 10, 1967). 
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has only recently begun to improve8 as foreign states have started 
to show concern for, and to take legal measures against, the use 
of their territory as a market for goods obtained illegally in Peru. 
It is too early to say how the situation may evolve, but is is clear 
that improved cooperation among foreign states to prevent the most 
blatant abuses, such as those that occurred in the 1930's, will lead 
to a better atmosphere. 
Finally, in this context, one must mention evidence that has 
been uncovered concerning actual instigation and financing of theft 
and illicit excavation from abroad.9 It is a mistake, therefore, to sim-
ply consider controls on export and efforts to get international action 
in support of such controls, merely in the context of some kind of 
restraint of trade. It is fundamentally linked, and has been since 
the beginning of the use of law in this context, as a backup to the 
prevention of illicit excavation and theft. 
It is also a mistake to assume, as some writers seem to do, 
that this is basically a concern of developing states. New Zealand, 
Canada, and Australia are all states which have recently taken ac-
tion to control export and to protect their cultural heritage from 
exploitation, though of course they intend to leave open avenues 
for legitimate trade.10 The United States also now has two provi-
sions in its basic legislation on antiquities:11 one concerns traffick-
ing in goods illegally excavated under federal law; the other con-
cerns trafficking in goods illegally excavated under state law. 
Moreover, the U.S. penalties are considerably more severe than in 
many other jurisdictions. It should also be recalled that concern 
about illicit excavation and export of native American relics, and 
the consequent damage to sites, was the basis of the now superseded 
Antiquities Act of 1906.12 
8. Schaedel & Shimada, Peruvian Archaeology, 1946-80: An Analytic Overview, 12 
WORLD ARCHAEOLOGY 359, 362-66 (1982). 
9. See, e.g., United States v. Hollinshead, 495 F.2d 1154 (9th Cir. 1974). See also R. 
Steinfeld & D. Heath, An Update on the Cultural Properties Issue (May 12, 1982) (unpublished 
paper at Brown University), which provides an interesting description of the mechanics of 
this process. 
The recent theft of valuable objects from an Islamic museum in Israel further illustrates 
this problem. The police are "investigating the possibility that the robbery was made 
according to orders placed by unscrupulous collectors .... " N.Y. Times, Apr. 17, 1983, at 
Al2, col. 5. 
10. See, e.g., Antiqutities Act, [1975] 1 N.Z. Stat. 337; Cultural Property Export and 
Import Act, [1975], 1 Can. Stat. ch. 50. 
11. Archeological Resources Protection Act of 1979 § 6, 16 U.S.C. §§ 470ee(b), 470ee(c) 
(1982). 
12. American Antiquities Preservation Act, ch. 3060, 34 Stat. 225 (1906). 
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A large collection of native American artifacts, now in the Na-
tional Muse um of Helsinki, was exported in 1891. This aroused a 
great deal of controversy at the time and was one of the factors 
leading to the adoption of the 1906 statute. In view of this incident 
and the current concern of native Americans to ensure that their 
cultural heritage is properly protected and cared for, it is not 
unrealistic to expect increasing pressure on the authorities to pre-
vent the export of those native American artifacts that are still 
in this country, and to ask other countries for their cooperation in 
stopping illegal export by instituting and enforcing import prohibi-
tions. In other words, all countries share a concern for the preven-
tion of damaging exploitation of archaeological resources and theft 
of works of art and relics. The additional concern of states which 
assert their need to prevent all export is understandable in a 
historical context, and can be expected to change once countries 
develop appropriate national collections, and see that other states 
are cooperating to stop activity which has a serious exploitative 
effect on the cultural heritage. 
It should also be noted that the UNESCO Convention on the 
Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and 
Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property,13 was the culmination 
of a long line of historical development. In August 1922, soon after 
its founding, the League of Nations considered a report on the 
serious dilapidations of the cultural heritage. It adopted a resolution 
recommending international cooperation on this matter. On the in-
itiative of the British Academy, the International Association of 
Academics adopted resolutions formulated, basically, for the man-
dated areas.14 The Treaty of Sevres, which was signed on August 
10, 1920, but never ratified, attempted to impose on Turkey cer-
tain principles regarding the control of excavations which includ-
ed restrictions on alienation and export. Although these provisions 
never became binding on Turkey, they did become binding on Iraq 
13. Nov. 14, 1970, 823 U.N.T.S. 231. 
14. Article 14 of the mandate agreement for Syria-Lebanon, administered by France, 
included provisions on archaeological excavations and export control which were incorporated 
in a decree by the French administration. This decree is still in force in Lebanon, although 
it has been superseded in Syria. Similar provisions were included in article 21 of the Man-
date agreement for Palestine, administered by the United Kingdom, which were incorporated 
into an ordinance. This ordinance has been superseded both in Jordan and in Israel. Detail-
ed information about the legislation currently in force in over 300 jurisdictions around the 
world, as well as its historical development, is given in L. PROTT & P.J. O'KEEFE, LAW AND 
THE CULTRURAL HERITAGE: DISCOVERY AND EXCAVATION (1983). 
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by virtue of a treaty of 1922, between Great Britian and Iraq, which 
obliged Iraq to adopt an antiquities law based on the provisions 
of the Treaty of Sevres.15 This became the basis of the first anti-
quities law in Iraq. 
The 1930's witnessed many other attempts to formally protect 
the cultural heritage. A draft Convention on the Repatriation of Ob-
jects of Artistic, Historical or Scientific Interest, Which Have Been 
Lost, Stolen or Unlawfully Alienated or Exported was submitted 
to the Member States of the League of Nations in 1933, but was 
not adopted.16 A draft Convention for the Protection of National 
Historic or Artistic Treasures was submitted to the Members States 
of the League of Nations in 1936, and was referred back for fur-
ther study.11 A draft Convention for the Protection of National Col-
lections of Art and History, drawn up in 1939, which would have 
applied only to objects individually catalogued as belonging to a 
State, but which were stolen and unlawfully expatriated therefrom, 
was never adopted because of the outbreak of war .18 Lastly, the 
Final Act of the Cairo Conference of 1937, which adopted certain 
international principles applicable to archaeological excavations, 
formed the basis of the 1956 UNESCO Recommendation on tl)at 
topic.19 Thus, the 1970 Convention did not emerge suddenly within 
the context of UNESCO. It was the end product of a long line of 
efforts to stop the pillaging and looting of archaeological sites, and 
the theft of cultural property of extreme importance. Such efforts 
which had been pursued within the framework of the organized in-
ternational community ever since such a framework existed and 
which had frequently been frustrated. 
II. THE UNESCO CONVENTION ON THE MEANS OF 
PROHIBITING AND PREVENTING THE ILLICIT IMPORT, 
EXPORT AND TRANSFER OF OWNERSHIP OF 
CULTURAL PROPERTY2° 
The major international legal instrument which currently 
operates to protect cultural heritage from the ravages of organiz-
15. 113 BRIT. & FOREIGN ST. PAPERS 652 (_); see de Visscher' La protection des patri-
moines artistique et historique nationaux: necessite d'une reglementation internationale, 43-44 
MOUSEION 7, 15-16 (1938). 
16. 14 LEAGUE OF NATIONS 0.J. 1394-96 (1933). 
17. 17 LEAGUE OF NATIONS 0.J. 1310 (1936). 
18. 20-21 LEAGUE OF NATIONS 0.J. _ (1939). 
19. M. Pallottino, Proposals for European Action for the Protection of the 
Archaeological Heritage, Council of Europe, Doc. CCCC/AC (65) 13, 5-6. 
20. Nov. 14, 1970, 823 U.N.T.S. 231. 
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ed theft and illicit excavation is the 1970 UNESCO Convention. 
Whatever other means may have been proposed in the draft instru-
ments that were considered by the League, this convention relies 
on the enforcement of export prohibitions through the agreement, 
of other states, to place import prohibitions on material illegally 
exported from its country of origin. There are many reasons why 
this concept was difficult for some states to accept, including the 
fact that some states have traditionally not regulated in this way. 
Some alarm was expressed at the terms of the original draft, which 
would have required states to take penal action against persons 
who acquired goods which had been illegally exported from their 
country of origin. Two things can be said about fears over possible 
universal criminal jurisdiction.21 First, little effort seems to have 
been put into the question of finding an alternative method to im-
port control for breaking the nexus between illegal excavation or 
theft, and sale in a foreign market. Second, some of the fears seem 
to be not well reasoned. 
In fact, the proposal did not amount to true universal jurisdic-
tion, because parties would only have imposed a penalty on those 
who infringed on the import or export prohibition of the country 
itself, not.of any country whatever. It would not have had the same 
effect as universal jurisdiction unless every state had adopted the 
UNESCO Convention, a somewhat unlikely situation, and if each 
were prepared to prosecute nationals of other states for offenses 
against the export restrictions of third states. The draft Conven-
tion, however, was substantially modified in deference to the views 
of countries which had difficulties with it, particularly the United 
States.22 Many of the amendments consisted of the insertion of 
phrases such as: "as appropriate for each country;"23 "consistent 
with national legislation;"24 "to the extent feasible;" 25 "consistent 
with the laws of each State;"26 or "as far as it is able."27 These pro-
visions appear to give States Parties great leeway as to how they 
21. Abramson and Huttler, for example, argued that "[a] new category of international 
delinquent, the light-fingered curator, was to stand alongside the pirate and the planner 
of the aggressive wars, subject to universal criminal jurisdiction." Note, The Legal Response 
to the Illicit Movement of Cultural Property, 5 LA w & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 932, 952 (1975). 
22. Bator, An Essay on the International Trade in Art, 34 STAN. L. REV. 275, 372-76 
(1982). 
23. 823 U.N.T.S. at 238, 242. 
24. Id. at 240. 
25. Id. at 242. 
26. Id. at 244. 
27. Id. 
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implement the Convention, provided always that they undertake 
some means to prevent the illicit traffic in cultural property, which 
is the aim of the UNESCO Convention. 
It is interesting to look at the way in which the obligations 
of the UNESCO Convention have been interpreted. Article 7(b)(i), 
for example, requires states Parties "to prohibit the import of 
cultural property stolen from a museum, or religious or secular 
public monument, or similar institutions in another State Party."28 
It seems that a number of European states have interpreted this 
as meaning that they should institute customs controls at the fron-
tiers to prevent such import. This caused several problems. First, 
it is contrary to the whole philosophy of much of modern customs 
administration. The remarks of the Netherlands government, 
regarding its reasons for not becoming a party to the UNESCO Con-
vention are an example of this interpretation: 
With regard to the obligation to prevent the import of movables 
stolen from museums and the like in other countries, checks by 
officials have appeared impractical, if not impracticable. Controls, 
in order to be effective, should imply factual examinations of all 
transports upon importation, with the purpose of checking whether 
they contain any goods noted on a world-base as stolen property. 
In fact, examining shipments on such a large scale as to allow for 
a deterring effect is regarded neither practically possible nor 
desirable, because it would considerably hamper the flows of trade. 
Moreover, the breaking off of tariff and non-tariff barriers between 
a large number of countries in Western Europe ... goes along with 
the desire to simplify or even abolish customs formalities in the 
relations between these countries, and consequently goods, today, 
are in fact only examined at random, if at all. 29 
The second problem caused by this interpretation is that eleven 
European states are now members of the Common Market, and their 
powers over the institution of customs controls have been handed 
over, in some part, to the administration of that organization. On 
the other hand, not all European states currently share the view 
expressed above. For example, Italy is already a party to the 
UNESCO Convention, and France has already expressed its inten-
28. Id. at 240. 
29. Comments by the Netherlands government to UNESCO, quoted in, L.V. Prott & 
P.J. O'Keefe, National Legal Control of Illicit Trade in Cultural Property (study commis-
sioned by UNESCO and submitted to a Consultation of Experts held at UNESCO head-
quarters in Paris, Mar. 1-4, 1983). 
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tion of becoming a party. France is currently engaged in an examina-
tion of its domestic legislation to see whether any amendments will 
have to be made. Furthermore, Canada became a party to the 
UNESCO Convention and clearly did not feel that the interpreta-
tion suggested above was necessary: 
It is not intended ... to set up elaborate checks on imports at Ports 
of Entry to enforce this law. First, it is up to the importer to know 
whether or not the cultural property being imported has legally 
left its country of origin .... Second, the Act provides only for 
action to be taken when a reciprocating State requests in writing 
the recovery and return of cultural property illegally imported into 
Canada.30 
The Canadian view is that the creation of an offense of illicit im-
port does not involve the examination of all bags for possible in-
fractions. It does ensure, however, that if an offense has occurred, 
and the evidence comes to light in Canada, the offender can be pros-
ecuted under local law.31 This is, in fact, what Canada is now doing 
in the prosecution of a person who imported a Nigerian Nok 
sculpture without, as the prosecution alleges, the appropriate ex-
port authority from Nigeria. 
Yet another interpretation of the UNESCO Convention has 
been made by the United States. According to the Convention 
on Cultural Property Implementation Act,32 passed in December 
1982, action to recover and return cultural property illegally 
exported will only be taken when the items concerned have been 
specifically documented in the inventory of the institution from 
which they have been taken.33 This may, for example, seem to 
exclude material belonging to a church which has not been inven-
toried in its country of origin. This is an unfortunate restriction 
because some countries have an enormous amount of material of 
this kind, and it is a major task to properly catalogue it. Belgium 
has been engaged in a major task of this kind for some years, and 
a considerable amount of this material may "disappear" while the 
inventory is taking place.34 Many countries simply do not have the 
30. D.R. CAMERON, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE CULTURAL PROPERTY EXPORT AND IMPORT 
ACT (1980). 
31. Cultural Property Export and Import Act, (1974-1976) 1 Can. Stat. ch. 50. 
32. 19 u.s.c. §§ 2601-2613 (1982). 
33. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2607, 2610(2)(A). 
34. B. BURNHAM, THE ART CRISIS 82-83 (1975). See also B. BURNHAM, ART THEFT: ITS SCOPE, 
ITS IMPACT, ITS CONTROL (1978). 
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resources to complete such an inventory except over the course 
of many years, and in many cases there would surely be other 
acceptable evidence of origin which could be used. A lot depends, 
of course, on what is accepted to be an "inventory." It may be that 
"Contents of the Church of St. Mark at the village of Valparaiso" 
will be accepted as sufficient to satisfy the requirements of an in-
ventory, and that local evidence can be used to prove the identity 
of the goods in question. 
Another point of interest is the United States' interpretation 
of article 9. Article 9 provides: 
Any State Party to this Convention whose cultural patrimony is 
in jeopardy from pillage of archaeological or ethnological materials 
may call upon other States Parties who are affected. The States 
Parties to this Convention undertake, in these circumstances, to 
participate in a concerted international effort to determine and to 
carry out the necessary concrete measures, including the control 
of exports and imports and international commerce in the specific 
materials concerned. Pending agreement each State concerned 
shall take provisional measures to the extent feasible to prevent 
irremediable injury to the cultural heritage of the requesting 
State.35 
Section 2602(a)(2) of the U.S. Implementation Act permits the Presi-
dent of the United States to enter into a bilateral or multilateral 
agreement with a state that seeks U.S. aid under article 9 of the 
UNESCO Convention. The President's power to enter into such an 
agreement is limited: the agreement is not to be effective for more 
than five years,36 and the President must be satisfied that article 
9 of the UNESCO Convention "will be applied in concert with similar 
restrictions ... by those nations ... having a significant import 
trade" in these materials.37 The Implementation Act, however, 
allows action to be taken if the United States would be of substan-
tial benefit in deterring a serious situation of pillage.38 The five-
year period can be extended if the severe situation still remains;39 
but on the other hand, the President may suspend the agreement 
35. 823 U.N.T.S. at 242. 
36. 19 u.s.c. § 2602(b). 
37. 19 U.N.T.S. § 2602(c)(l). 
38. 19 U.S.C. § 2602(c)(2). 
39. 19 U.S.C. § 2602(e). 
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if he considers that other major importing states are not implemen-
ting these import restrictions.40 
The interpretation of the UNESCO Convention and its 
significance in the context of international attempts to control 
damage to archaeological and artistic heritage is important to 
understand. First, the U.S. legislation requires the State Party to 
prove that the cultural patrimony is in jeopardy due to the pillage 
of archaeological or ethnological materials from it.41 Second, the 
State Party must have taken measures, consistent with the Con-
vention, to protect its cultural patrimony.42 Third, the President 
must find that the imposition of the import restrictions by the 
United States and other importing states would have a significant 
beneficial effect.43 On the other hand, Canada, in its implementing 
legislation, did not feel that these steps needed to be taken. It clear-
ly felt that these were matters for the judgment of the country 
of origin, and that a simple request would be sufficient to activate 
the relevant provisions of the UNESCO Convention. 
It may be difficult for many states whose archaeological and 
legal resources are already severely stretched to mount a campaign 
in order to convince the U.S. administration that action is necessary. 
It may well be that such a case can only be provided if foreign ar-
chaeologists do it for them. Even the emergency implementation 
of import restrictions is subject to narrowly defined conditions,44 
and requires the requesting state to supply information "which sup-
ports a determination that an emergency condition exists."45 In its 
interpretation of the obligations of article 9 of the UNESCO Con-
vention to "take provisional measures to the extent feasible to pre-
vent irremediable injury to the cultural heritage of the requesting 
States,"46 the United States has probably taken the narrowest possi-
ble interpretation of the article. It remains to be seen whether this 
interpretation will be accepted by other States Parties to the 
UNESCO Convention as fulfilling the obligations of that state to 
the Convention. It must be recalled that the International Court 
40. 19 u.s.c. § 2602(d)(2). 
41. 19 U.S.C. § 2602(a)(l)(A). 
42. 19 U.S.C. § 2602(a)(l)(B). 
43. 19 U.S.C. § 2602(a)(l)(C)(i). 
44. 19 U .S.C. § 2603(a). 
45. 19 U.S.C. § 2603(c)(l). 
46. 823 U.N.T.S. at 242. 
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of Justice, in its opinion concerning Reservations to the Genocide 
Convention,47 held that, while states could limit their obligations to 
an international treaty,48 there is a certain core content which par-
ties must accept if they wish other states to acknowledge them as 
parties to the treaty.49 A debate could, therefore, take place on how 
far the obligations of articles 7 and 9 are core provisions of the 
UNESCO Convention, and how far the U.S. Implementing Act 
satisfies those obligations. 
On the other hand, the important progress which has been 
made must be clearly acknowledged. This is the first time that a 
general multilateral treaty has actually been adopted to deal with 
the severe problems linking theft and clandestine excavation with 
international trade, despite many previous attempts. The UNESCO 
Convention now has fifty-one parties,50 and the new impetus being 
given by the imminent participation of the United States and 
France, will probably lead to a considerably greater number of 
states becoming party to the Convention in the near future. There 
is also little doubt that the implementation of general international 
action by way of import controls, especially among the big art-
importing states, is in the position of being tested for the first time. 
It will, if put into effect, enable many important questions to be 
answered, such as: whether import control is the best way of deal-
ing with this problem; whether it will only lead to the diversion 
of the flow elsewhere to the detriment of those states who do 
honestly impose import controls; and, whether evidence of inter-
national concern for the problems faced by relic-rich countries will 
enable them gradually to take a more relaxed attitude about 
legitimate traffic. All these questions need to be answered: partly 
because they are, at the moment, subject to unproved assump-
tions and myth, which only becloud the issue; ,and partly because, 
if the answers are unfavorable, we should be looking at other 
alternatives. 
III. ALTERNATIVE COURSES OF INTERNATIONAL 
LEGAL CONTROL TO THE 1970 UNESCO CONVENTION 
It is worthwhile exploring what other courses of international 
legal action do exist to remedy the situation if: the UNESCO Con-
47. 1951 I.C.J. 15 (Advisory Opinion of May 28, 1951). 
48. In the case of the Genocide Convention, states indicated the limitations on their 
obligations by reservation. 
49. 1951 I.C.J. at 21-26. 
50. As of May 1983. 
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vention is not sufficiently widely adopted, its various interpreta-
tions are not accepted, or for some reason its implementation pro-
ves unsatisfactory. Other measures can also be taken side by side 
with the UNESCO Convention. As a first step, it should be pointed 
out that states can evolve satisfactory schemes even without the 
UNESCO Convention. For example, the Canadian implementing 
legislation will operate not only in relation to a State Party to the 
1970 UNESCO Convention, but in relation to any other international 
agreement to the same effect.51 Thus, a regional arrangement, or 
even a bilateral agreement along the same lines, would be a satisfac-
tory basis for requesting the help of Canada. 
Second, major importing states that have difficulties with the 
UNESCO Convention, for whatever reason, be it philosophical, con-
stitutional or practical, but ·that agree with its basic aim to save 
cultural heritage from damaging exploitation, should accept a special 
responsibility to develop other methods to break the links between 
theft and illicit excavation in the countries of origin, and in the in-
ternational market. For example, there are certain countries which 
supply a great deal of expertise in artworks and antiquities and 
through which much illicit traffic is directed. Without the services 
provided by their residents in authenticating, evaluating, restor-
ing, auctioning, and re-exporting such goods, much of the protec-
tion and profit of the illicit trafficker would be lost. Furthermore, 
the publicity surrounding the volume of the art trade, its soaring 
prices, the aggressive promotion by auction houses and the con-
tinual emphasis on the record-breaking sums reached, have done 
much to promote cultural property as a lucrative field for dishonest 
activities, and to attract illicitly acquired goods to the auction and 
sales rooms of the "art market" states. 
It is difficult to escape the conclusion that some members of the 
trade in art objects are indifferent to the origin of the goods being 
serviced. Though these dealers and experts prefer not to be engaged 
in outright dishonest practices, they may not inquire into the pro-
venance or authenticity of an object brought to them for service.52 
Protestations that it is difficult to detect stolen or clandestinely 
excavated, and illicitly exported goods could be more readily 
accepted if any real effort were being made to: check provenance,53 
51. Cultural Property Export and Import Act, [1974-1976) 1 Can. Stat. ch. 50. 
52. For some examples of this attitude in relation to acquisition, see T. HOVING, KING 
OF THE CONFESSORS, 63-68 (1981). 
53. Dealers in France are required to do so by law. 
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use the International Art Registry,54 or encourage and promote the 
use of export certificates. It is hard not to conclude that a large 
percentage of persons making their livelihood from activities 
associated with cultural property in "art market" countries prefer 
to have these activities unhampered in any way, even if this con-
tinues to encourage illicit traffic. 
It is worth discussing some of these activities in detail. One 
activity of importance is that of authentication. Many cultural 
experts, including some employed by government institutions, other 
public bodies, museums and auction houses, are consulted for their 
expert opinion, on the authenticity of particular objects. Though 
most of this work is perfectly proper use of expertise, it may con-
tribute to the success of the trafficker by improving the value of 
an object which has not good provenance, and by lending a spurious 
respectability to it. This is particularly true for goods obtained by 
clandestine excavation or theft. Thus, a statement by a respected 
expert that a given antiquity belongs to a specific period and a par-
ticular culture, where the provenance of the object is dubious, is 
certain to improve its marketability. The Australian Museum has 
stated that it will not authenticate cultural property which does 
not meet its criteria for acquisition,55 nor will it provide informa-
tion about where such authentication may be obtained. Apparent-
ly, there is an "upper crust" of art dealers who will guarantee the 
authenticity and provenance of every work sold.56 There are, 
however, in many "art market" states, generally no laws that re-
quire a dealer to give .those guarantees,57 much less any control over 
the issue of statements as to authenticity. It is, however, possible 
for a state to encourage museums and other institutions within its 
borders to adopt policies similar to that of the Australian Museum. 
Similar issues arise in respect of the evaluation of cultural 
goods. The Australian Museum in its policy statement has also 
declared that it will not make monetary valuations of cultural prop-
54. L. ADAMS, ART COP 57-59, 67-70 (1974). 
55. AUSTRALIAN MUSEUM, POLICY REGARDING ACQUISITION OF CULTURAL PROPERTY 
(19_). The Australian Museum has adopted a policy similar to that adopted by many 
American institutions to try to prevent feeding the trade in illicitly obtained goods. Examples 
are give in L. DuBOFF, THE DESKBOOK OF ART LA w 1169-83, (1977). 
56. B. BURNHAM, THE ART CRISIS 93 (1975). Burnham states that the dealer will guarantee 
that "the work is indeed what the dealer says it is" (authenticity), and that "the work has 
indeed been in all the previous collections listed, and that its history as presented is, to 
the dealer's knowledge, authentic" (provenance). Id. 
57. France is an exception to this, but is apparently ignoring the requirement in 
practice. 
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erty, nor will it give information as to where such valuations may 
be obtained. The same considerations apply to evaluation as apply 
to authentication. It might be added that the practice of certain 
"experts" in acting as appraisers in connection with particular 
dealers has already proved unfortunate with respect to works which 
are of doubtful attribution, or have been "restored."58 It should be 
noted that the American Institute for Conservation of Historic and 
Artistic Works provides in its Code of Ethics "the issuing of paid 
expertises or authentications may involve conflict of interest and 
is not an appropriate or ethical activity for a conservator."59 
Objects which have been illicitly exported after being stolen 
or clandestinely excavated are often sent to another country for 
restoration. In a restorer's workshop in Munich in 1973, an ancient 
bronze sculpture reputedly by Lyssippus, first became widely 
known, although it had apparently been found in waters off the 
Italian coast in 1964, bought by a dealer, sold to a South American 
collector, and then resold by him to an English firm, who then sent 
it to the restorer.60 The Sivapuran Nataraja sculpture, illegally ex-
ported from India, apparently began its complicated journey when 
it was sent to a restorer for treatment and was shipped to a pro-
fessional bronze restorer in England in 197 4.61 It is also true that 
"restorers" are sometimes used to camouflage stolen goods and that 
police are often able to trace stolen goods by checking on suspect 
"restorers." Dishonest dealers may also substitute copies for ge-
nuine work at this stage. Note that the American Institute for Con-
servation of Historic and Artistic Works in its Code of Ethics 
regards authentications, appraisals for a fee, and engaging in art 
dealing, as inconsistent with the professional activity of 
conservators. 
A person who has illicitly acquired cultural goods may wish 
to send them for sale to an "art market" state. At present there 
is no requirement in these states for a dealer to see a valid export 
certificate, even for works which are patently of foreign origin and 
recent arrival. Article lO(a) of the 1970 UNESCO Convention re-
quires State Parties to: 
58. See the account of the relationship between Bernard Berenson and the dealer 
Joseph Duveen in SECREST, BEING BERNARD BERENSON 232-74 (1979). 
59. AMERICAN INSTITUTE FOR CONSERVATION OF HISTORIC AND ARTISTIC WORKS CODE OF 
ETHICS art. v.c. (19_). 
60. The National Times (Australia), Dec. 26, 1977, at 10. 
61. An account of this case is given in B: BURNHAM, supra note 56, at 87-93 (1975). 
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oblige antique dealers, subject to penal or administrative sanctions, 
to maintain a register recording the origin of each item of cultural 
property, names and addresses of the supplier, description and 
price of each item sold and to inform the purchaser of the cultural 
property of the export prohibition to which such property may be 
subject.62 
France has legislation that requires the registration of traders and 
the keeping of puPchase records by traders in movable objects. The 
French law also requires dealers to make inquiries as to provenance, 
and to guarantee title.63 In other countries, many professional groups 
are subject to registration, self-regulation, or government super-
vision. There may also be, of course, police surveillance of dubious 
dealers, but generally dealers are not required to guarantee 
provenance. 
The use of auction houses by illicit traffickers to dispose of 
their goods is also not difficult. The world's largest auction houses, 
situated in London, are subject to very little control. Traditional-
ly, they have satisfied themselves that the seller is the prima facie 
owner of the piece, and that is all. They are not required to 
guarantee title or examine provenance, although they may include 
in the catalogue such details as are known to them. The auction 
houses usually include in their conditions of sale an exclusion of 
responsibility for genuineness, authorship, provenance, etc.64 Though 
recently there has been more finesses applied to the process (e.g. 
by the publication, in sale catalogues, of a glossary of terms in which 
delicate nuances convey thin shades of doubt on these matters), this 
is hardly an impediment to the auctioning of goods of suspect origin. 
The result is that illegally acquired goods are passed on through 
the auction houses without difficulty. Consider the extraordinary 
case of Winkworth v. Christie, Manson & Woods Ltd.,65 where the 
original English owner of a collection of miniatures was unable to 
regain them when they appeared at an English auction house a few 
years after they had been stolen from him. The current vendor 
derived his title from a transaction in Italy, where the thief had 
evidently passed them on. Under Italian law, his ownership was 
62. 823 U.N.T.S. at 243. 
63. Law of 15 February 1898, Decree 70,788 of 27 August 1970 (France); see also the 
Regles de la Profession d' Antiquiarie et Negociant en Oeuvres d'Art Tableaux Anciens et 
Modernes, text given in CHATELAIN, FORGERY IN THE ART WORLD Annex 6 (1976). 
64. J. BROUGH, AUCTION 171 (1963). 
65. [1980] 1 Ch. 496. 
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protected by the bona fide purchaser rule. The result of this bizarre 
ruling suggests that unique and easily identifiable goods of cultural 
importance can be auctioned every few years without any hindrance, 
if the thief takes the precaution of "laundering" them through a 
jurisdiction which has a bona.fide purchaser rule and the appropriate 
interval is allowed to elapse. In France auctioneers are subject to 
much more stringent conditions regarding guarantee of title, but 
it seems that these statutory requirements have been weakened 
by judicial interpretation.66 
It can be readily seen, therefore, that there is at present, lit-
tle to hinder the use of the services provided by "art market" coun-
tries to illegal traffickers. If states want to have an alternative to 
the UNESCO Convention, or a supplementary system of control, 
moves could be made to unify rules in these countries on the provi-
sion of these services, with the aim of ensuring that they are not 
used for the benefit of the illicit trade. 
There is yet another method that could be used to stop the 
wealth of art collectors in the importing states from being implicated 
in damage to the cultural heritage. It is clear that attempts to stop 
trafficking have often encountered problems of differing types of 
regulation in other states, which enable the dishonest to "shop" for 
jurisdictions. A typical example is the variation in the period of 
limitation in regard to the restitution of stolen property, and the 
refusal by courts of one state to pay attention to another state's 
restrictions on alienability. There .may be good reasons for the rules 
in each jurisdiction, and it may be that there would be serious in-
convenience in trying to alter them. Nevertheless, a good case could 
be made for doing so, at least in regard to cultural goods of great 
importance. Although these procedural rules are, at the moment, 
the subject of private international law, they can become public in-
ternational law through the simple process of treaty-making. 
As many states have expressed their deep concern about what is 
presently happening to the cultural heritage, this is a method 
which could be explored. Along with rules pertaining to inalienabil-
ity and prescription, attention could be paid to: the recognition and 
enforcement of foreign judgments, standing to sue, the law to be 
applied to the transfer of movables, the rules as to restitution, and 
confiscation, or damages which affect the return of cultural prop-
66. CHATELAIN, supra note 63, at 110-13. For a comparison with the auction law in the 
European states, see id. at 110-19. 
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erty. Another area which should be looked at is the bona fide pur-
chaser provision which operates in many countries. At least in rela-
tion to valuable items of cultural property, it would seem ap-
propriate to require a person claiming the benefit of such a provi-
sion to prove that he had made some inquiries as to provenance. 
An international agreement could be made along these lines, which 
have already been suggested in a broader context, by UNIDROIT's 
draft Uniform Law on the Acquisition in Good Faith of Corporeal 
Movables.67 Of course, these are only suggestions, and much more 
work needs to be done on all these proposals before they can become 
the subject of an international legal instrument. Still, it is impor-
tant to point out that the 1970 UNESCO Convention is not the only 
answer. If international law now has to be employed to deal with 
a serious problem of concern to all states, there are many 
possibilities. The existing framework should not stop us from ex-
ploring other possibilities. 
Finally, it should be noted that the Council of Europe is work-
ing on a draft Convention for the Suppression of Offenses against 
Cultural Property. The purpose behind this Convention is to make 
certain offenses against cultural property, such as clandestine ex-
cavation, punishable by ensuring that the principles of cooperation 
in criminal matters, already in force in Europe, are applied to and, 
where necessary, specifically tailored to, offenses against cultural 
property.68 Although a good deal of work has been done on the Con-
vention, it appears to be taking a number of years to come to frui-
tion, for reasons which are not altogether clear.69 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Legal measures can be supplemented by other measures. For 
example, aid to museums in countries of origin in the cataloguing 
of holdings, in their conservation and in local education, could take 
a great deal of strain off their resources and help engender a 
cooperative spirit which would lead to less suspicion and bitterness, 
and more understanding of the legitimate interests of both art-
exporting and art-importing states. Some institutions are already 
67. The operation of these rules and suggestions for their improvement is discussed 
in some detail in National Legal Control of Illicit Traffic, supra note 29. 
68. Dockx, The Council of Europe's Draft Commission on Stolen Art, 2 ART RESEARCH 
NEWS 12 (1983). 
69. See Bassiouni, Reflections on Criminal Jurisdiction in International Protection of 
Cultural Property, 10 SYR. J. INT'L L. & COM. _ (1983). 
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providing such help, but more can be done. Help with museum 
security, for example, may avoid problems of theft from National 
collections which are in nobody's interest but the illegal trafficker's. 
Aid to impoverished local populations who, at the moment, are easily 
persuaded to engage in clandestine activity by traffickers prepared 
to dispense a little money could provide alternative sources of in-
come and prevent much damage. Assistance to the administration 
or particular relevant officials, in art-exporting countries, to devise 
appropriate methods of controlling export would also help. 
The circulation of illicitly acquired cultural property is 
everyone's problem. The sale to, and subsequent return by, a 
museum in the United States of a mosaic stolen from a site in Syria, 
is directly counter not only to the interests of both States,70 but 
to the interests in the orderly excavation and curation of impor-
tant cultural works of people everywhere. Because improper activity 
has gone beyond the capacity of any national state to control, the 
use of international law to prevent it is in the interests of us all. 
70. Bator, supra note 22, at 284. 
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